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1.14.0
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UDIF: Universal Digital Identification Framework 1.1.0.0a (A1)
A quantum-secure cryptographic identification
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The Universal Digital Identification Framework is a post-quantum identity, object, registry, query, and audit framework. It represents roots, branch controllers, group controllers, user agents, and owned objects as canonical binary records. Certificates, capabilities, object records, query records, registry leaves, and anchor records are encoded deterministically and are bound to post-quantum signatures, SHA3-family digests, and MCEL ledger commitments.
UDIF separates administrative authority from object ownership. Root authorities issue Branch Controller certificates. Branch Controllers issue Group Controller certificates. Group Controllers issue User Agent certificates. User Agents are the only entities that own objects. All administrative actions, object operations, registry commits, treaty events, query responses, and anchor submissions are validated against certificate role, certificate status, capability scope, canonical encoding, and ledger continuity before they are accepted.
The Root Authority is the trust anchor for a UDIF domain. It creates the self-issued root certificate, defines the domain suite, accepts branch enrollment requests, verifies child anchors, and maintains the top-level membership ledger for the domain.
The Branch Controller administers a subordinate portion of the hierarchy. It may issue child branch or group certificates according to its role and capability mask, receive child anchors, enforce suspension and revocation, and participate in bilateral treaty channels with peer domains.
The Group Controller is the enforcement point for User Agents. It issues UA certificates, validates object creation and transfer operations, maintains membership, transaction, and registry ledgers, evaluates authorized query predicates, and forwards only treaty-scoped queries.
The User Agent is the leaf entity that owns objects. A UA maintains its object registry, signs object operations, originates authorized queries, and communicates through its Group Controller. UAs do not exercise administrative authority over other entities.
UDIF structures are serialized using fixed-size fields, fixed field order, little-endian integer encoding, raw byte arrays for serials, hashes, public keys, and signatures, and exact-length decoders. Signed structures are hashed over their canonical representation excluding the signature field. This deterministic form prevents serialization ambiguity and ensures that digests, signatures, Merkle roots, and MCEL commitments are byte-stable.
Certificates bind a role, suite identifier, issuer serial, subject serial, validity window, policy epoch, public key, and capability bitmap to a parent signature. Capability inheritance is restrictive: a child capability mask may not exceed the parent authority. Runtime capability tokens are authenticated with KMAC and resolved through the capability store before query evaluation or protected operations are admitted.
Objects are 32-byte-serial records owned by User Agents. Object creation is signed by the owner and logged by the Group Controller. Transfers require valid sender and receiver signatures over the same transfer digest before the GC logs the transfer and updates the sender and receiver registry states. Registries are Merkle trees over canonical object leaves and support membership proof generation and verification against anchored registry roots.
UDIF uses MCEL for membership, transaction, and registry commitment ledgers. Checkpoint groups are summarized into signed Anchor Records containing the membership root, registry root, transaction root, child serial, timestamp, event counters, and exact 0-indexed sequence number. Parents accept only the expected genesis sequence 0 or the exact next sequence value. Duplicate, skipped, forked, stale, future, wrong-child, and bad-signature anchors are rejected.
UDIF uses QSTP as the outer cryptographic transport substrate. QSTP performs authenticated channel establishment, packet protection, and transport-level rekeying. The UDIF payload sealed by QSTP is:
UDIF-Header || UDIF-Message
The UDIF inner header contains the record class flags, sequence number, UTC timestamp, epoch, and suite identifier. After QSTP authenticates and opens the protected record, UDIF validates the inner header and then dispatches the decoded message. Record-class flags must match the message class exactly; ambiguous combined classes are rejected. This implementation therefore uses a QSTP-wrapped inner-record model rather than a separate UDIF AEAD layer with externally supplied associated data.
UDIF supports existence, owner-binding, attribute-bucket, and membership-proof query predicate families. Query predicates are canonicalized by type, authorized by capability digest and KMAC tag, evaluated without leaking target state on authorization failure, and answered with signed yes, no, or deny responses. Cross-domain queries require an active bilateral treaty whose parties, peer serials, signatures, expiry, and predicate scope are verified before forwarding or execution. Treaties are non-transitive.
The implementation follows the UDIF fail-closed model: exact-length decoding, recursive certificate-chain validation, role/message dispatch gates, active certificate-status checks, strict sequence and timestamp checks, constant-time digest comparisons where security-sensitive, QSC allocation and zeroization utilities, and digest-only ledger commitments. Security hardening also avoids large transient protocol objects on the stack in the tunnel, MCEL, and role-server dispatch paths.
1.14.0